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INTERNATIONAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT 
AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
Joshua Aizenman
University of California at Santa Cruz 
Several factors, apart from the exchange rate regime, influence 
the comfort level in regard to reserves. Illustratively, they would 
include vulnerability to the real sector shocks, strength of the 
fiscal and financial sectors, current account balance, the changing 
composition of capital flows, a medium-term view of growth prospects 
encompassing business cycles, etc. In a sense, official reserves have 
to reflect the balancing and comforting factors relative to external 
assets and liabilities in the context of a rational balance sheet 
approach.
—Y. V. Reddy, Reserve Bank of India
Following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s it was likely that 
countries might choose to build up large foreign exchange reserves 
in order to be able to act as a “do it yourself” lender of last resort in 
U.S. dollars.
— Mervyn King, Bank of England
This paper assesses the costs and benefits of active international 
reserve management. The first part outlines and appraises various 
channels through which international reserve management may 
enhance economic performance, focusing on two important channels: 
it lowers the real exchange rate volatility induced by terms-of-trade 
shocks; and it provides self-insurance against sudden stops and 
fiscal shocks, thereby reducing the downside risk associated with 
adverse shocks. Two additional channels, for which the evidence is 
weaker, are as follows: international reserve management is alleged 
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to lead to higher growth by fostering exports (that is, it operates 
through a mercantilist motive); and it has a greater capacity to 
smooth adjustment to shocks over time, thereby reducing the speed 
of adjustment of the current account.
My analysis of international reserve management supplements the 
insights of earlier literature, which focus on using international reserves 
as a buffer stock, in the context of managing an adjustable-peg or 
managed-floating exchange rate regime.1 While valid, the buffer stock 
approach best fits a world with limited financial integration, where 
trade openness determines countries’ vulnerabilities to external shocks. 
In the absence of reserves, balance-of-payments deficits would have 
to be corrected via a reduction in aggregate expenditures, imposing 
adjustment costs. As greater trade openness increases the exposure 
to trade shocks, minimizing adjustment costs requires higher reserve 
holdings. The rapid financial integration of developing countries and 
the financial crises of the 1990s have led analysts to focus on the 
growing exposure to sudden stops and on capital flow reversals.2 In 
such a world, financial markets may force an adjustment well before 
commercial trade flows would adjust on their own, which raises the 
importance of exposure to financial shocks and the costs associated 
with disintermediation triggered by adverse liquidity shocks. 
Section 1 empirically evaluates the impact of international 
reserves on real exchange rate volatility in the presence of terms-
of-trade shocks. The evidence suggests that international reserves 
play a role in the mitigation of terms-of-trade shocks in developing 
countries, but not among member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Economic structure 
matters greatly: exports of natural resources double both the impact 
of terms-of-trade shocks on the real exchange rate and the impact of 
the mitigation associated with international reserve management 
on the real exchange rate. These results are consistent with the 
notion that the limited development of capital markets in developing 
1. Optimal reserves balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in 
the absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of holding reserves (see Frenkel 
and Jovanovic, 1981). The buffer stock model predicts that average reserves depend 
negatively on adjustment costs, on the opportunity cost of reserves, and on exchange 
rate flexibility; and positively on GDP and on reserve volatility, which is frequently 
driven by the underlying volatility of international trade. Overall, the literature of 
the 1980s supported these predictions; see Frenkel (1983), Edwards (1983), and Flood 
and Marion (2002).
2. See Calvo (1998), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2003), and Edwards (2004a, 
2004b) for an assessment of sudden stops in developing countries. 437 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
countries hampers the authorities ability to mitigate the volatility 
associated with shocks. Section 2 models such a mechanism, explaining 
possible effects of international reserve management in the presence 
of costly financial intermediation of long-term investment. Section 
3 summarizes the debate about international reserve management 
and mercantilist motives, outlining the empirical and theoretical 
limitations of the mercantilist approach. Section 4 evaluates the 
impact of international reserves on current account persistence. The 
results support the notion that a higher buildup of reserves improves 
countries buffer against shocks, thereby reducing the speed of 
adjustment of the current account. This outcome is consistent with the 
importance of current account adjustments in allowing for smoother 
consumption, in the presence of limited financial integration and 
sudden stops. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the limitations 
of international reserve management. 
1. REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY, TERMS OF TRADE, 
AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
This section focuses on some of the challenges facing a developing 
country with limited development of its internal capital market, a 
growing integration with the global financial system, and a large 
exposure of the current account to terms-of-trade effects. This 
description applies especially to commodity-exporting countries, 
which are subject to large terms-of-trade shocks. While favorable 
terms-of-trade shocks tend to induce real appreciation and capital 
inflows, the downturns associated with adverse shocks impose 
daunting challenges. The literature of the 1990s identified large 
adverse effects of exogenous volatility on gross domestic product 
(GDP) and economic growth in developing countries.3 Fundamentally, 
this issue hinges on the nature of nonlinearities affecting the 
economy, in that strong concavity may generate first-order adverse 
effects of volatility on GDP and growth. An important channel that 
may explain such negative level and growth effects of volatility are 
imperfect capital markets. 
3. See Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion (1993), and the references 
in Aizenman and Pinto (2005) for the association between macroeconomic volatility 
and growth. See IDB (1995) and Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) for the impact 
of terms-of-trade shocks and other foreign shocks on growth in Latin America and in 
developing countries.438 Joshua Aizenman
Aghion and others (2006) illustrate these considerations: they 
find that real exchange rate volatility reduces growth for countries 
with relatively low levels of financial development. This and other 
studies suggest that factors mitigating real exchange rate volatility 
may be associated with superior economic performance. The large 
hoarding of international reserves by developing countries in recent 
years raises the question of the extent to which these reserves have 
affected the volatility of the real effective exchange rate. For most 
countries, terms-of-trade shocks are the most important source 
of exogenous volatility, frequently leading to real exchange rate 
volatility and potentially magnifying business cycle volatility. This 
issue is pertinent for developing countries, as they are exposed to 
terms-of-trade volatility, the standard deviation of which is three 
times the volatility of industrial countries. Relatively small, shallow 
domestic financial systems and the lack of sectoral diversification in 
most developing countries limit the authorities’ ability to mitigate 
terms-of-trade shocks by internal adjustment. Sovereign risk and 
the lack of proper financial instruments inhibit their ability to 
hedge against these shocks by relying on the global financial system 
(see Caballero, 2003; Caballero and Panageas, 2003). Developing 
countries may be left with self-insurance as a last resort for dealing 
with terms-of-trade shocks. 
In Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006), we confirm this possibility. 
We start by applying a rudimentary panel regression methodology 
and show that the main result is robust to adding controls and to a 
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where the independent variable is the log of the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), defined so that a higher REER indicates real 
appreciation. The term a1 represents country fixed effects, TOT is the 
terms of trade, TO = ln{1 + [(IM + EXP) / 2GDP]} is the trade openness 
measure, and RES = ln[1 + (International Reserves / GDP)] is a proxy 
for the ratio of international reserves to GDP. 
The specification of regression (1) follows the observation 
that TO * TOT

 is a first-order approximation of the income effect 439 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
associated with a terms-of-trade improvement rate of TOT

, where 
the income effect is defined as the GDP rate of change induced 
by a terms-of-trade shock. I henceforth refer to TO * TOT

 as the 
effective terms-of-trade shock. By design, equation (1) implies that 
the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to the effective 
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Regression (1) thus provides information about the degree to which 
hoarding international reserves may affect REER dynamics induced by 
terms-of-trade shocks. Table 1 reports the regression results for 1970–
2004. Column 1 presents the baseline regression pooling all countries, 
subject to data availability.5 The elasticity of the real effective 
exchange rate with respect to the effective terms-of-trade shock is 
well above one: a one percent improvement of the effective terms of 
trade induces a real effective exchange rate appreciation of about 1.8 
percent. Hoarding international reserves lessens the elasticity of the 
real effective exchange rate with respect to the terms of trade by more 
than twice the ratio of international reserves to GDP—that is, column 
1 implies that u ln(REER) / [TO*uln(TOT)] ! 1.8(1 – 2*RES).
Equation (2) is the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with 
respect to the effective terms of trade. This implies that the elasticity 
of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the terms of trade 
is u ln(REER) / uln(TOT) = TO*(B1 – B2*RES) ! TO*1.8(1 – 2*RES). 
For a country with a trade openness of 0.2, and a ratio of international 
reserves to GDP of 0.1, the elasticity of the real effective exchange 
rate relative to the terms of trade is 0.25*1.8(1 – 2*0.1) = 0.36. This is 
in line with De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), who find that the elasticity 
of the real effective exchange rate with respect to the terms of trade, 
unconditional of the reserve position, is about 0.4. 
4. Throughout the discussion, I presume that trade openness and the ratio of 
international reserves to GDP are characterized by low volatility relative to terms-of-
trade volatility. 
5. See table 2 for regressions of the real effective exchange rate on the effective 
terms of trade and international reserves in the absence of interaction terms. For 
developing countries, the elasticity of the real effective exchange rate with respect to 
the effective terms of trade is well above one, whereas the elasticity of the real effective 
exchange rate with respect to the ratio of the stock of international reserves to GDP is 
well below minus one. In other words, a higher reserves-to-GDP ratio is associated, on 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aggregation matters. Columns 2 and 3 show that this result 
applies to developing, but not to industrial countries. This is consistent 
with the notion that limited development of the capital market in 
developing countries hampers their ability to mitigate the volatility 
associated with shocks. Economic structure matters greatly: exports 
of natural resources magnify the impact of the effective terms-of-trade 
shocks and the mitigation associated with international reserves by a 
factor exceeding two. The international reserve effect is insignificant 
for that group, yet it is significant for the lagged terms-of-trade shock, 
as I show below. In contrast, these interactions are insignificant 
for manufacturing-intensive countries. The last two columns focus 
specifically on Latin America and Asia. Terms-of-trade shocks induce 
large effects in both regions, whereas international reserves induce 
a powerful mitigation of the terms-of-trade shock in Asian countries, 
but not in Latin America. 
Table 3 verifies the robustness of prior results, redoing the base 
regression of the case for evaluating the adjustment to the one-year 
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The signs are identical to table 1. The main difference is that 
shocks are apparently absorbed faster in Latin America and Asia 
than in other regions; most of the coefficients on the lagged shocks 
are insignificant for these blocks.
Table 4 reports country-specific results for several Latin American 
countries. The last two columns represent the total effect of changes in 
the terms of trade (amplified by trade openness) on the real exchange 
rate, taking into account the mitigation offered by international 
reserves: 
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Overall, the results suggest that reserves play a role in the mitigation 
of terms-of-trade shocks only in developing countries. While this role 
differs widely across countries, the mitigation role of international 
reserves is important, especially in countries with abundant natural 
resources, like Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.
Table 4. The Log of the Real Effective Exchange Rate versus 
the Terms of Trade: Selected Individual Countriesa
Explanatory variable Argentina Chile Ecuador Mexico
Terms of trade 44.994 8.436 7.158 3.841
(6.597)*** (1.561)*** (1.322)*** (2.048)*
TOT*Reserves –793.738 –50.188 –46.25 –177.211
(113.969)*** (13.080)*** (21.816)** (71.729)**
N o .  o b s e r v a t i o n s2 52 32 32 3
R2 0.5594 0.6338 0.6600 0.1901
Total effect, 1990–99 –0.764380 –1.465110 3.386239 –5.692390
Total effect, 2000–04 –27.473900 –0.973320 5.400608 –9.719750
Volatility of TOT 0.0099 0.0517 0.0573 0.0360
Source: Author’s estimations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The dependent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate.
The results reported above focus on the association between 
the level of ln(TOT) and RES on ln(REER). Aizenman and Riera-
Crichton (2006) also verify that a higher ratio of international 
reserves to GDP is associated with a lower REER volatility. This 
result is consistent with Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci (2004), who 
focus on the association of the ratio of international reserves 
to GDP with REER volatility, controlling for exchange rate 
regimes. Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006) also confirm that 
the mitigation effects identified in equation (2) continue to hold 
when the regressions control for exchange rate regimes and for the 
composition of capital flows.6 
6. See Broda and Tille (2003) for the role of exchange rate flexibility in 
accommodating the adjustment to terms-of-trade shocks. 445 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
2. THE MODEL: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, SELF-INSURANCE, 
AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
A growing literature identifies financial intermediation, in the 
presence of collateral constraints, as a mechanism for explaining 
the hazard associated with credit cycles induced by shocks. The 
prominent role of bank financing in developing countries suggests 
that capital flights, triggered by adverse terms-of-trade shocks or 
contagion, impose adverse liquidity shocks. This section outlines a 
model describing the conditions under which the ex ante hoarding of 
international reserves may provide a self-insurance mechanism that 
would mitigate the real effects of liquidity shocks, ultimately reducing 
the adverse effects of terms-of-trade volatility on GDP. For simplicity, 
I focus on an ex ante/ex post model dealing with the determination of 
the GDP level and the real exchange rate in one investment cycle. By 
applying the logic of endogenous growth, one may extend the model 
to address the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on growth. 
As my focus is on developing countries, I assume that all financial 
intermediation is done by banks, which rely on debt contracts. 
Specifically, I consider the case in which investment in a long-term 
project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity 
shocks. Shocks may thus force costly liquidation of earlier investments, 
thereby reducing output. I solve the optimal demand for deposits and 
international reserves via a bank that finances investment in long-
term projects. The bank’s financing uses callable deposits, which 
expose the bank to liquidity risk. Macroeconomic liquidity shocks, 
stemming from sudden stops and capital flights, cannot be diversified 
away. In these circumstances, hoarding reserves saves liquidation 
costs and potentially leads to large welfare gains—gains that hold 
even if all agents are risk neutral. In this framework, deposits and 
reserves tend to be complements: more volatile liquidity shocks will 
increase both the demand for reserves and deposits. This is another 
example of hoarding international reserves as self-insurance against 
nondiversifiable liquidity shocks.7
I model financial intermediation and the real exchange rate 
by combining Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) insight with Aghion, 
Bacchetta, and Banerjee’s (2004) modeling of market imperfections 
7. See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Rodrik and Velasco (2000), García and Soto 
(2004) Aizenman and Lee (2007), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005), and Rodrik (2006) for 
studies addressing various aspects of self-insurance and international reserves. 446 Joshua Aizenman
in a collateral-dependent small open economy.8 I construct a minimal 
model to explain the self-insurance offered by international reserves, 
in the form of mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks with 
endogenous real exchange rate determination. Investment in a long-
term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity 
shocks, so the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of the 
earlier investment, reducing second-period output. I simplify further 
by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the 
entrepreneur: the entrepreneur is the bank owner and uses the bank 
to finance investment.
I consider a small open economy in which a traded good is 
produced with capital and a country-specific nontraded factor. The 
traded sector includes commodity exports, which generate revenue 
determined by the realization of terms-of-trade shocks (equal to the 
relative price of the exported commodities vis-à-vis other traded 
goods). The traded good is the numeraire. The relative price of the 
nontraded factor is denoted by p, and it is referred to as the real 
exchange rate There is a continuum of lenders and borrowers, and 
their number is normalized to 1. 
I focus now of the evolution of the economy throughout one 
investment cycle, where gestation lags imply that capital should be 
installed well before a specific nontraded input is hired. To simplify, 
the supply of the specific factor is inelastic, at a level Z. The lenders 
in the economy cannot invest directly, but lend their saving at the 
international interest rate. Depositors are entitled to a real return of 
rf on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of investment. 
The safe return reflects a risk-free investment opportunity, either in 
the form of a foreign bond or as storage technology. The borrowers 
are entrepreneurs who have investment opportunity, but are credit 
constrained. The actual investment should be undertaken prior to 
the realization of liquidity shocks. The production function is a Cobb-
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where K1is the nonliquidated capital invested at period 1 and z is 
the level of the country-specific input, hired at a relative price of p1. 
Premature liquidation of capital is costly and is associated with a 
8. The model extends the one-sector framework outlined in Aizenman and 
Lee (2007). 447 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
proportionate adjustment cost of R. Specifically, reducing the capital 
stock by one dollar yields a net liquidity of 1/(1 + R). 
The time line associated with financial intermediation 
is summarized in figure 1. At the beginning of period 1, the 
entrepreneur with initial wealth of H1 borrows NH1.9 The combined 
liquidity of (1 +N)H1 finances planned investment, K1. Setting aside 
liquid reserves R: 
1 11 1  	
  N HKR .  (6)
Figure 1. The Time Line
Beginning of period 1:
Entrepreneurs with initial wealth H1, subject to collateral 
constraint μuse bank financing μH1. The combined liquidity,
(1 + μ)H1, finances investment, K1, and hoarding of reserves,
R1, such that (1 + μ)H1 = K1 + R1.
End of period 1:
A liquidity shock materializes; an adverse shock,
δ (where δ < 0), induces a deposit drop  of l(–δ)μH1. Then, 
reserves, R1, are used to finance any liquidity shock and to hire 
the nontraded–specific input, z (at p1). Costly liquidation
of capital from K1 to K1(where K1 < K1) would boost liquidity







 C C. Nonliquidated deposits
are paid a return of rf.  Any unused reserves yield a return of rf.
9. Collateral constraints can be shown to arise as a result of capital market 
imperfections in the presence of moral hazard and costly monitoring; see Holmström 
and Tirole (1997) and Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999). 448 Joshua Aizenman
Next, a liquidity shock, E, is realized. A positive shock is 
inconsequential, because banks can accommodate positive liquidity 
shocks by purchasing a risk-free bond or investing in the risk-free 
low-yield storage technology. I therefore concentrate on adverse 
liquidity shocks, which reduce desirable deposits from NH1 to 
NH1(1 + lE), where E < 0, l > 0. The model focuses on the impact of 
adverse liquidity shocks on optimal investment and liquidity: I do not 
model the reasons for the shock. Such a shock may reflect external 
developments, such as a higher foreign interest rate, contagion, or a 
reaction to a signal revealing the future terms of trade. For example, 
suppose that the public learns of a signal, E, that determines the 
second-period foreign currency earnings from commodity exports. A 
negative terms-of-trade shock may induce anticipation of an economic 
slowdown, triggering capital flights and reducing deposits from 
NH1 to NH1(1 + lE). Independently of the exact source of the adverse 
liquidity shock, gestation lags associated with tangible investment 
and costly liquidation expose the bank to the downside risk associated 
with abrupt adjustment. 
 The bank uses reserves to meet the liquidity shock and to purchase 
the nontraded input. The liquidly shock may be met by costly liquidation 
of capital if needed. Consequently, the ultimate capital is
K























I assume that the liquidity constraint is binding and that the marginal 
productivity of the nontraded input exceeds the return on liquid 
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where p1 may depend on E. 449 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
To gain further insight, it is useful to focus on the simplest discrete 
example, in which an adverse liquidity shock of E = –F (where 0 < F < 1) 
has a 50 percent probability of taking place and the incidence of 
no liquidity interruption similarly has a 50 percent probability of 
occurring. The value of F corresponds to the volatility of the liquidity 
shock, E. The asymmetric nature of tangible investment implies that 
only negative liquidity shocks may require real adjustment. In these 
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where  KK 11 r .
The equilibrium is then characterized by the following three 
propositions: 
—First, if no liquidation would take place in the bad state 






























If liquidation would occur in the bad state (KK 11  ), then the optimal 
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—Second, the threshold volatility associated with partial 
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Hence, a small enough leverage and a large enough adjustment 
cost implies  F1, such that the liquidation option would not be 
exercised. In these circumstances, the optimal investment and the 
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—Third, if   F1, the partial liquidation option would be exercised 
in bad times only if the volatility exceeds the threshold,  FF  1. For 
volatility below the threshold, FF   1, no liquidation would take place, 
and the equilibrium is characterized by equations (13) and (14).
The proof of this proposition is as follows: 
—The characterization of the planned investment and the ex 
ante hoarding of reserves (equation 13) follows by solving K1 from 
equation (10a). 
—The optimal stock of capital following partial liquidation 
(equation 11) is obtained by maximizing the profits in bad times 
relative to K1(the second line of equation 8). Note that K1 was preset 
at the beginning of the planning horizon. 
—The volatility threshold inducing liquidation in bad times,  F  , 
is obtained by noting that at FF  , KK 11  . –In other words, the 
liquidation is zero at the lowest volatility associated with liquidation 
in bad times. After solving equation (11) for the case where  KK 11   , 
I infer that451 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
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The actual level of  F is solved from equation (10b), after substituting 














Smaller leverage and larger adjustment costs imply a higher 
threshold of volatility associated with liquidation (see equation 
12). In the no-liquidation range() FF   , equation (13) implies that 
investment drops by half of the anticipated liquidity shock. This 
drop is financing an equal increase in the ex ante hoarding of 
international reserves, which will mitigate the effects of adverse 
liquidity shocks in bad times. The adverse liquidity shock would 
induce a real depreciation of (FClNH1)/Z (see equation 14). The extra 
liquidity induced by hoarding reserves and the real deprecation in 
bad times allow the economy to adjust fully without the need to 
liquidate tangible capital. This comes, however, at the cost of a drop 
in planned investment and output.
If   F1, the regime is mixed: for volatility far enough above the 
threshold, the regime is characterized by a partial liquidation of capital 
in bad times; for volatility below the threshold, the liquidation option 
would not be exercised. Hence, high enough volatility induces a regime 
switch from no liquidation to the partial liquidation of capital. 
Figure 2 provides an example of the two regimes, tracing the 
optimal planned investment, K1, as a function of volatility. Given 
that R1 = (1 + N)H1 – K1, the patterns of reserves as a function 
of volatility are the mirror image of the patterns of the planned 
investment: dR1/dF = –dK1/dF. Panel A (B) corresponds to a relatively 
high (low) adjustment cost, R = 0.20 (R = 0.02). Under relatively 
low volatility, liquidation would not be exercised, whereas higher 
volatility would reduce the planned investment and increase the 
level of reserves. These reserves would be used to meet adverse 
liquidity shocks, eliminating the need to engage in a costly ex post 
liquidation of productive investment. High enough volatility implies 
that the liquidation option would supplement the defensive hoarding 
of reserves. Note that liquidation mitigates the adverse impact 
of higher volatility on the planned investment, as can be seen by 452 Joshua Aizenman
comparing the slopes of the two lines below and above the volatility 
threshold,  F. This mitigation involves a deadweight loss associated 
with adjustment costs. 
Figure 2. Volatility and Planned Investmenta
A. 2 = 0.2
B. 2 = 0.02
Source: Author’s construction.
a. The simulation corresponds to the case n which C = 0.5; l = 1.0; H = 1.0; and N = 1.0.
The regime switch to the partial liquidation regime triggers a 
discrete drop of the planned investment, and a matching discrete 
jump in the ex ante hoarding of reserves. This follows from the 
observation that the switch to the partial liquidation regime increases 
the marginal valuation of liquid reserves. The intuition for this is 
straightforward: in the partial liquidation regime, an extra unit of 453 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
liquid reserves eliminates the need to liquidate 1 + R capital, saving 
the deadweight loss of R. This marginal benefit of liquidity is absent in 
the no-liquidation regime. Consequently, at the regime switch, there is 
discontinuity where the ex ante demand for liquidity jumps, inducing a 
drop in planned investment. This drop increases with the adjustment 
costs, as is vividly illustrated by the contrast between the two panels 
of figure 1. This point can be confirmed by comparing equations (11) 
and (13a) at the threshold volatility associated with regime change. 
If the no-liquidation and liquidation regimes are denoted NL and LQ, 


















A key variable is the adjustment cost parameter, R, which 
measures the flexibility of capital market adjustment. Greater 
flexibility of the adjustment reduces the role of international 
reserves, as well as the overall impact of volatility on investment 
and the real exchange rate. 
Hoarding reserves mitigates the volatility of the real exchange 
rate and of the adverse effects of liquidity shocks on GDP. To fully 
appreciate this observation, it is useful to evaluate the expected 
output in the absence of the precautionary adjustment of international 
reserves. Using the parameters specified in panel A of figure 2, I 
set planned capital at K1 = 1. The actual capital in the presence of 
a liquidity shock and the absence of the precautionary adjustment 
in international reserves would have been Kl H 11 11   NF R () . The 
solid line in figure 3 plots the expected output in this regime as a 
fraction of the output that would have obtained if the liquidity shock 
had been zero. The bold line is the expected normalized output for the 
case in which reserves are adjusted to prevent the need to liquidate 
capital, as in equation 1). The figure vividly illustrates the first-order 
gain associated with the precautionary adjustment of international 
reserves. The precautionary adjustment of reserves also reduces 
volatility and the real effective exchange rate. 
The present model is not detailed enough to identify who would 
hold the international reserves—private banks or the central bank. In 
the presence of capital controls, as in China, the international reserves 
would be held by the central bank. With full integration of capital 454 Joshua Aizenman
markets and convertibility and with an efficient market for excess 
reserves that allows diversifying idiosyncratic shocks, the bulk of the 
international reserves may be held by private banks. However, given 
moral hazard considerations (as in Levy Yeyati, 2008) or the absence 
of an efficient market for excess reserves, the bulk of the international 
reserves would be held by the central bank. 
The model described above is stylistic, in that I do not derive 
the collateral constraint endogenously and I do not claim that the 
debt contract or the resolution of the liquidity shock is the most 
efficient solution. If the debt contract is taken as exogenously given, 
the resulting role of international reserves can be characterized.10 
The model suggests that adverse liquidity shocks triggered by a 
deterioration in the terms of trade are accommodated by lower 
reserves and real depreciation, adjustments that limit the necessary 
liquidation of capital. While the above framework dealt with one 
investment cycle, it can be extended into a dynamic set up, in which 
10. See Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003) for further discussion of the 
mutual benefits of transfers from an unconstrained traded sector to a constrained 
nontraded sector in the presence of liquidity pressure. I also do not model the mechanism 
inducing capital flight in the presence of adverse terms-of-trade shocks. This may reflect 
both contagion and the possibility of multiple equilibrium, or fundamental forces (such 
as the search for a higher return on savings). For further discussion of fundamentals-
based crises, see Allen and Gale (1998) and Goldfajn and Valdés (1997); for panic-based 
crises, see Chang and Velasco (2000).
Figure 3. Volatility and Relative Expected Outputa 
Source: Author’s construction.
a. The simulation corresponds to the case in which R = 0.2; C = 0.5; l = 1.0; H = 1.0; and N = 1.0. The bold curve 
corresponds to no liquidation and optimal precautionary demand for reserves; the solid curve corresponds to zero 
precautionary demand, with all the adjustment made through liquidation.455 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
the next cycle resembles a similar sequence, subject to updating the 
entrepreneurs’ initial wealth by the profits of the previous investment 
cycle and by any outside income. In the extended setup, improvements 
(deterioration) in the terms of trade would tend to lead to a further 
real exchange rate appreciation (depredation). This would be the case 
when the entrepreneurs’ outside income includes proceeds from the 
exported commodity, implying that higher wealth would increase 
the future demand for the nontraded input. This would also be the 
case if the nontraded input has other uses, which cause the demand 
for the input to rise with the wealth of the economy. 
The above discussion provides only one possible mechanism to 
account for the buffering role of international reserves. Although I 
focus on the adjustment to terms-of-trade shocks, the buffering role 
of international reserves also applies when the shocks stem from the 
financial sector, in the form of a sudden stop or reversal of the current 
account. For example, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) study a model 
in which a sudden stop of capital inflows results in an abrupt current 
account reversal, inducing a sizable real exchange rate depreciation. 
In their model, the required real depreciation and the growth costs 
of the sudden stop depend negatively on the country’s degree of 
openness. This observation is consistent with the Mundell-Fleming 
tradition, whereby the expenditure-reducing effort, for any given 
level of expenditure switching, is inversely related to the marginal 
propensity to import. The tests reported in Edwards (2004b) confirm 
these perditions. Hence, the buffering role of international reserves 
reported in this paper may be especially relevant for countries that 
are exposed to sudden stops and current account reversals and more 
closed to international trade.11 
 The greater financial and commercial integration of developing 
countries implies that sudden stops and current account reversals 
may be associated with complex feedbacks between financial and 
real shocks, which affect other markets through financial and 
trade linkages (for example, through bilateral trade, competition in 
third markets, and financial contagion; see Glick and Rose, 1999; 
Calvo, 1999; Forbes, 2004). When push comes to shove, having deep 
international reserves allows the central bank to be of lender of last 
resort independently of the sources of capital flight, which improves the 
11. This suggests that countries specializing in the export of commodities, with 
limited diversification of their exports, tend to be more vulnerable. They may be 
relatively closed to trade both as a result of low trade openness and because their export 
supply is relatively inelastic with respect to the real exchange rate.456 Joshua Aizenman
bank’s capacity to address sudden stops and reversals of capital inflows 
(see Calvo, 2006). In principle, what matters is a country’s ability to 
come up with hard currency when a crisis occurs. The optimal reserves 
and optimal debt should therefore be decided jointly. A country that 
has borrowed externally to its limit may need more reserves than one 
that has room for more borrowing.12 
3. INTERNATIONAL RESERVE MANAGEMENT AND 
MERCANTILIST MOTIVES
The discussion in the previous section viewed international 
reserve management in the context of reducing the costs of economic 
volatility, reflecting the desire for self-insurance against exposure 
to future sudden stops. This view faces a well-known contender in a 
modern incarnation of mercantilism: the accumulation of international 
reserves is triggered by concerns about export competitiveness. This 
explanation has been advanced by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Garber (2003), especially in the context of China. The issue is of 
more than academic importance: the precautionary approach links 
reserve accumulation directly to exposure to sudden stops, capital 
flight, and volatility, whereas the mercantilist approach views reserve 
accumulation as a residual of an industrial policy that may impose 
negative externalities on other trade partners. Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber interpret reserve accumulation as a by-product 
of promoting exports, which are needed to create better jobs to absorb 
abundant labor in traditional sectors, mostly agriculture. Under 
this strategy, reserve accumulation may facilitate export growth by 
preventing or slowing appreciation: 
We argued that a sensible development policy might involve creating 
a distortion in the real exchange rate in order to bias domestic 
investment toward export industries. Sensible here means that 
the resulting capital stock will be superior to that generated by a 
badly distorted domestic financial system and other relative price 
distortions typical of emerging market countries. (Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber, 2005.) 
The mercantilist explanation for hoarding international 
reserves presumes that a monetary policy that affects the level of 
12. See Zhou (2005) for conformation of this observation. 457 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
the exchange rate has permanent real effects. While the view that 
monetary instability has adverse long-run real consequences is 
well supported by empirical studies, there is no comparable body 
of evidence that validates the long-run real impact of setting the 
level of the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the neoclassical adjustment mechanism works even 
in China—economic growth leads to real appreciation independently 
of the exchange rate regime. 
The growing importance of foreign direct investment, and 
the observation that countries experiencing a large foreign direct 
investment inflow do occasionally hoard international reserves, 
underscored an extended version of the revived Bretton Woods system, 
in which international reserves are viewed as collateral reducing the 
risk associated with FDI: 
Delivering goods and services up front is a crude form of collateral. 
But there is no credible alternative. Market participants individually 
could pledge financial assets in the center country, but the only way 
that the aggregate of the periphery can acquire assets in the U.S. is 
to run a current account surplus. In an important sense, the goods 
and services already delivered to the U.S. support the stock of U.S. 
claims on the periphery; it is the collateral that powers the entire 
development strategy.
The nature of the social collateral is so obvious it is hard to see. 
If the center cannot seize goods or assets after a default, it has to 
import the goods and services before the default and create a net 
liability. If the periphery then defaults on its half of the implicit 
contract, the center can simply default on its gross liability and keep 
the collateral. The periphery’s current account surplus provides 
the collateral to support the financial intermediation that is at the 
heart of Asian development strategies. The interest paid on the net 
position is nothing more than the usual risk free interest paid on 
collateral. (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2005.)
The wide-reaching implications of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Garber (2005) have propagated a spirited debate that goes well beyond 
the scope of this paper.13 Some view the modern mercantilist approach 
as a valid interpretation for most East Asian countries, arguing that 
they follow similar development strategies. This interpretation is 
intellectually intriguing, yet it remains debatable. Observers point 
13. See Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006); Eichengreen (2006a); Glick and 
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out that high export growth is not the new kid on the block—it is the 
story of East Asia over the last fifty years. Yet, the large increase 
in hoarding reserves has occurred mostly after 1997. Indeed, in the 
cases of Japan and Korea, the policy tool of choice during their rapid 
growth phase was selective favorable financing of targeted sectors, 
not hoarding international reserves.14 Both countries began hoarding 
international reserves after the end of the high growth phase. 
Aizenman and Lee (2007) test the importance of precautionary and 
mercantilist motives in accounting for the hoarding of international 
reserves by developing countries. While variables associated with 
the mercantilist motive (like lagged export growth and deviation 
from purchasing power parity) are statistically significant, their 
economic importance in accounting for reserve hoarding is close to 
zero and is dwarfed by other variables. Overall, the empirical results 
in Aizenman and Lee (2007) are in line with the precautionary 
demand. The effects of financial crises have been localized, in that 
reserve hoarding has increased in the aftermath of crises mostly in 
countries located in the affected region, but not in other regions. A 
more liberal capital account regime is found to increase the amount 
of international reserves, in line with the precautionary view. 
These results, however, do not imply that the hoarding of reserves 
by countries is optimal or efficient. Making inferences regarding 
efficiency would require a detailed model and much more information, 
including an assessment of the probability and output costs of sudden 
stops and the opportunity cost of reserves. 
Aizenman and Lee (2006) propose a new interpretation of 
the association between mercantilism, economic growth, and the 
hoarding of reserves based on the development strategies of East 
Asian countries in the second half of the twentieth Century. The 
history of the region suggests that export promotion was largely 
achieved through preferential financing, which effectively subsidized 
investment in targeted sectors. This was achieved in several ways, 
including direct subsidies funded by state banks; financial repression, 
to the extent that favored sectors enjoyed preferential access to 
cheaper external borrowing; and moral suasion, whereby private 
banks were encouraged to provide favorable financing. Aizenman 
and Lee refer to this policy as financial mercantilism and contrast 
14. Both Japan and Korea were closed to foreign direct investment in their rapid 
growth periods. The view that foreign direct investment is the key for successful 
development in East Asia thus remains debatable. 459 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
it with monetary mercantilism, a policy that hinges on hoarding 
international reserves. 
The history of Japan and Korea features the near absence of 
monetary mercantilism during the fast growth phase, although 
financial mercantilism was vigorously applied. In both countries, the 
switch to large hoarding of international reserves occurred at times 
of collapsing growth. Thus, if monetary mercantilism played any 
significant role in these countries, it was in periods of disappointing 
growth. The legacy of financial mercantilism was a deterioration of 
the balance sheets of affected banks. The circumstances under which 
floundering growth leads to the switch from financial mercantilism to 
a large hoarding of reserves are associated with a growing fragility 
of the banking system—and while financial fragility is relatively 
sustainable in times of rapid growth, it may induce a banking crisis 
when growth flounders.15 Precautionary motives may then lead 
countries to hoard international reserves to mitigate the possible 
transmission of a banking crisis to a currency crisis. Given limited 
data, such a response may be observationally equivalent to the 
predictions of monetary mercantilism. It is hard to disentangle 
precautionary hoarding from monetary mercantilism using good data 
on international reserves but spotty data on nonperforming loans. 
Moreover, monetary mercantilism and precautionary hoarding may 
be mutually reinforcing: the benefit of competitiveness may reduce 
the effective cost of hoarding reserves and induce governments to 
prefer reserve hoarding over alternative precautionary means. 
China’s hoarding of reserves picked up sharply after the Asian 
crisis. Unlike Japan and Korea, China is accumulating reserves 
without having gone through a sharp slowdown in economic growth. 
The recent history of Japan and Korea probably encouraged China to 
adopt a dual strategy of financial mercantilism and rapid hoarding 
of international reserves. As much as China is growing even faster 
than Japan and Korea in their early years and is going through 
its takeoff process in the era of a highly integrated global financial 
market, China arguably faces a much greater downside risk of social 
15. The research triggered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) points out that 
greater financial fragility increases the odds of a currency crisis. Hutchison and Noy 
(2005) report that “the onsets of 31 percent of banking crises were accompanied by 
currency turmoil. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant correlation between 
lagged banking crises and contemporaneous currency crises, but not vice versa.” This 
observation is consistent with the insight of models of financial fragility, exemplified 
by Chang and Velasco (2000).460 Joshua Aizenman
and political instability associated with a crisis than did Japan or 
Korea. This greater downside risk of recession and financial crisis may 
explain the Chinese eagerness both to push financial mercantilism 
and to aggressively hoard reserves to buffer the downside risk of the 
economy’s growing financial fragility.16 Given the sheer size of China 
and its reserve hoarding, however, other countries in the region may 
be tempted to engage in competitive hoarding to mitigate their loss 
of competitiveness in third markets. 
Monetary mercantilism is also associated with negative 
externalities akin to competitive devaluation. When one country 
hoards international reserves in response to short-run competitiveness 
concerns, other countries may adopt a similar policy to preempt 
any competitive advantage gained by the first country. These 
circumstances may lead to competitive hoarding of reserves, which, 
in turn would dissipate any competitiveness gains. Aizenman and 
Lee (2007) provide a simple framework illustrating the welfare losses 
associated with competitive hoarding. These losses may provide a 
novel argument in favor of regional funds, viewed as a mechanism for 
coping with regional negative externalities. The greater importance 
of manufacturing in East Asia relative to Latin America, combined 
with the deeper financial repression in some East Asian countries, 
suggests that the case for an Asian fund is stronger than that for a 
similar regional fund among Latin American countries.17 
Recent empirical research, while still preliminary, provides 
evidence consistent with this discussion. The mercantilist motive 
predicts that countries exporting to the same third market and 
competing for market shares there may engage in competitive 
hoarding. This implies a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses pattern of 
hoarding international reserves, in line with Cheung and Qian 
(2006). They find evidence of an interdependence of holdings of 
international reserves in East Asia; this finding is robust to the 
16. In the case of China, the ratio of banks’ nonperforming loans to international 
reserves is estimated to range somewhere between 20 percent (according to the Bank 
of China) and more than 90 percent (see Jim Peterson, “Balance Sheet: China Offers 
Fertile Soil for Investor Unhappiness,” International Herald Tribune, 11 September 
2006). These numbers highlight the uncertainty of estimating the economywide 
burden of financial weakness, which itself would add to the demand for precautionary 
hoarding. 
17. The presumption is that the real exchange rate has greater consequences 
on the competitiveness of manufacturing exporters than on countries specializing 
in commodities and raw materials; for further discussion of regional funds, see 
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presence of standard macroeconomic determinants, a few controls, 
and a few alternative specifications of the so-called Joneses variable. 
For ten East Asian countries, they find that a dollar increase in 
international reserves by one country is associated with an increase 
of about 0.6 dollar by the other nine peer countries. The evidence 
about the undervaluation of China, however, is inclusive.18 This 
may reflect the low explanatory power of tests dealing with the 
real exchange rate, as well as the possibility that the neoclassical 
adjustment mechanism operates even for countries engaging in 
competitive hoarding of international reserves. 
4. CURRENT ACCOUNT PERSISTENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
RESERVES 
The purpose of this section is to ascertain the degree to which a 
higher ratio of international reserves to GDP ratios is associated with 
greater capacity to smooth adjustment to shocks over time, resulting 
in more persistent current account patterns. In contrast, a low 
level of reserves may require a fast, rigid adjustment of the current 
account to shocks, when deviations from a balanced current account 
position are hard to sustain. I evaluate this possibility by applying 
the methodology of Taylor (2002), in which the speed of adjustment of 
the current account (CU) back toward its equilibrium or steady-state 
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The autoregressive reinterpretation of equation (16), (CU/GDP) t 
!(1 + C) (CU/GDP)t–1 + Ft, clarifies that a value of C  close to minus 
one implies no persistence of the current account pattern, as would be 
the case if the adjustment to a shock is contemporaneous. In contrast, 
18. Aizenman and Lee (2007) find that, as predicted by the mercantilist use of 
reserves, deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) are statistically significant 
in explaining the hoarding of international reserves. Nevertheless, the economic 
importance of deviations from PPP in accounting for reserve hoarding is close to zero 
and is dwarfed by other variables. Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2006) report that “once 
sampling uncertainty and serial correlation are accounted for, there is little statistical 
evidence that the RMB is undervalued, even though the point estimates usually indicate 
economically significant misalignment.”
19. See Taylor (2002) for a discussion linking the above estimation to intertemporal 
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a value of |C| closer to zero implies greater persistence of the current 
account, allowing for a more protracted adjustment to shocks. 
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where (CU/GDP) = ln[1 + (Current Account / Domestic GDP)], and 
both the current account balance and the domestic GDP are measured 
in current U.S. dollars. Table 5 shows the coefficient of adjustment 
and thus a measure of persistence for the current account balance for 
1970–2004, subject to data availability, and subsets of the data such 
as developing countries, developed OECD countries, manufacturing 
exporters, natural resource exporters, and Latin American and Asian 
emerging economies. The table also reviews subsamples from 1980–92 
and 1993–2004, and it also breaks down indebtedness and income 
as classified by the World Bank. The table reveals that developing 
countries are characterized by a faster current account adjustment 
than OECD countries, Latin American economies adjust faster than 
Asian emerging economies, and exporters of natural resource adjust 
faster than manufacturing exporters.
I turn now to a cross-country study testing the impact of 
international reserves on the speed of adjustment. On average, one 
would expect that a higher buildup of reserves gives countries a better 
buffer against shocks, thereby reducing the speed of adjustment of 
the current account and resulting in a positive association between 
international reserves and C. I apply a two-step derivation of the 
relationship between reserves (and other government assets) and 
current account persistence. In the first step, I derive a measure of 
current account persistence.
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This yields one C coefficient per country. The countries, the number of 
observations used in the autoregressive estimation of C, and the fitted 
values are listed in Aizenman (2006, tables B1–B4). Table 6 provides 









All countries –0.437*** 0.026 4,053 0.2548
Developing –0.441*** 0.027 3,346 0.2608
OECD –0.260*** 0.036 707 0.2315
Manufacturing exporters –0.250*** 0.056 273 0.3655
Commodity exporters –0.362*** 0.049 391 0.4182
Latin America –0.432*** 0.088 594 0.3082
Asia –0.217*** 0.063 298 0.3812
1980–1992
All countries –0.544*** 0.041 1,661 0.3316
Developing –0.546*** 0.042 1,394 0.3336
OECD –0.433*** 0.057 267 0.2228
Latin America –0.523*** 0.091 234 0.3395
Asia –0.248*** 0.067 114 0.1626
1993–2004
All countries –0.563*** 0.046 1,708 0.3421
Developing –0.568*** 0.047 1,445 0.3443
OECD –0.347*** 0.059 263 0.2224
Latin America –0.507*** 0.059 216 0.3963
Asia –0.315*** 0.087 112 0.166
Indebtedness
Severely indebted (Debt1) –0.435*** 0.047 1,016 0.2737
Moderately indebted (Debt2) –0.512*** 0.040 930 0.3515
Less indebted (Debt3) –0.412*** 0.057 999 0.2449
Income level
Low (Income1) –0.413*** 0.044 1,137 0.2679
Lower-middle (Income2) –0.495*** 0.056 1,105 0.3302
Upper-middle (Income3) –0.496*** 0.057 844 0.2809
High (Income4) –0.315*** 0.050 961 0.224
Source: Author’s estimations.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The dependent variable is D(CU/GDP). For a list of the indebtedness ranking of each country and the breakdown 
by income level, see Aizenman (2006, tables B1–B2, available online at papers.nber.org/papers/w12734). 464 Joshua Aizenman






Argentina –0.396 0.083*** 34 0.1896
Brazil –0.214 0.093** 34 0.0841
Chile –0.447 0.117*** 34 0.2108
Costa Rica –0.329 0.103*** 34 0.1602
Dominican 
Republic
–0.477 0.232** 34 0.1703
Ecuador –0.73 0.185*** 34 0.3629
El Salvador –0.917 0.196*** 34 0.47
Haiti –0.282 0.126** 32 0.153
Honduras –0.586 0.163*** 30 0.2968
Mexico –0.413 0.149*** 34 0.2041
Uruguay –0.494 0.128*** 34 0.2462
Venezuela –0.656 0.129*** 34 0.3164
Source: Author’s estimations.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
The persistence proxy used in the next step is simply the value 
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where B =C + 1. In the second step, I look at the cross-section relationship 
between the measure of persistence represented by B and a series of 
structural parameters for these economies, on the one hand, and a 
measure of the stock of reserves deflated by GDP, on the other. 20
The univariate regressions reveal that higher reserves, higher 
GDP growth, and a lower share of commodities are associated with a 
significant increase in the persistency of the current account for non-
OECD countries (see table 7). International reserves are insignificant for 
a sample that includes the OECD countries. The multivariate regressions 
20. Out of 134 countries, ten countries have negative alphas that would represent 
extreme volatility in the current account. These countries are generally small economies 
with very sensitive external sectors. To reduce noise in future regressions, I have purged 
these countries from the data. (See the countries in italics in Aizenman, 2006, table 
B4; available online at papers.nber.org/papers/w12734). 465 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
indicate that for developing countries, higher persistence is positively 
associated with a higher reserves-GDP ratio, lower inflation, greater 
exchange rate flexibility (measured as the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate), and a higher share of manufacturing (see table 8).
Table 7. Univariate Regressionsa
Explanatory variable All countries Non-OECD countries
Reserves 0.068 0.183
(0.110) (0.100)*
Nominal exchange rate volatility –0.056 0.058
(0.247) (0.240)
Financial integration 0.142 –0.042
(0.110) (0.113)
Terms of trade 0.058 0.116
(0.083) (0.085)
GDP growth 1.701 2.119
(0.635)*** (0.639)***





* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The dependent variable is alpha. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The results reported above are consistent with the consumption-
smoothing role of current account adjustments. To illustrate, consider a 
benchmark neoclassical economy in which consumption is determined 
by the permanent income hypothesis (that is, linear marginal utility 
of consumption); output follows a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), 
process defined asYY Y Y Y tt t     SF () 1 (where |S| < 1, with output 
reverting to the long-run mean,Y , at a rate determined by 1 – S); and 
agents can borrow and lend at the real interest, r, which also equals 
their subjective rate of time preference. Then, around the long-run 
equilibrium,21 
21. This follows from the observation that in such an economy, Ct
 = rBt
 +Y
+ [r/(1 – r – S)](Yt
 –Y ). Hence, CUt= rBt+Yt
 – Ct
 = [(1 – S) / (1 + r – S)] (Yt
 –Y ).
In the vicinity of the long-run equilibrium, (CUt/Y ) = [(1 – S) / (1 + r – S)]{ S(Yt–1–Y)
+YFt]/ Yt} = S(CUt–1/Yt–1)(Yt–1/Yt) + (1 – S) / (1 + r – S)(Y/ Yt) Ft
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Hence, B S . Next I modify the above assumptions to add the possibility 
of sudden stops. Specifically, assume that the probability of a sudden 
stop, which terminates the ability to borrow externally, is ', where 
' = '(IR/Y) and 'a < 0. Under these circumstances, 
B S (1 – '). (21)
This suggests that a negative association between sudden stops 
and hoarding reserves may account for the impact of international 
reserves on the persistency of current account adjustment. 
Table 8. Multivariate Regressiona





Nominal exchange rate volatility 0.566 0.545
(0.303)* (0.294)*
Terms of trade 0.177 0.195
(0.088)** (0.098)*
Financial integration 0.298 0.076
(0.114)** (0.127)
Manufacturing exports 0.784 0.628
(0.212)*** (0.225)***
Summary statistic
No. observations 94 80
R2 0.2084 0.1618
Source: Author’s estimations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The dependent variable is alpha. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.467 International Reserve Management and the Current Account
5. ON THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVE 
MANAGEMENT
I close the paper with a discussion of the limitations of 
international reserve management. While useful, international 
reserve management is not a panacea, and it is subject to serious 
limitations as outlined below.
First, as with any insurance, there is no way to avoid various layers 
of moral hazard, which can be broken down into macroeconomic and 
microeconomic hazards. With regard to the former, any deep pot of 
resources may be the target of opportunistic raiding by policymakers in 
regimes characterized by political instability and limited monitoring. 
Central bank independence helps and is desirable, but it is not 
sufficient to overcome this obstacle.22 Microeconomic moral hazard, 
in turn, centers on the likelihood that large stockpiles of reserves may 
subsidize risk taking, especially if the hoarding is viewed as a signal 
of a low probability of exchange rate changes.23 
Second, international reserve management carries fiscal costs, 
including a direct opportunity cost (that is, the marginal product of 
investment or the cost of external borrowing) and any marginal costs 
of sterilization.24 Hauner (2005) estimates these costs for a hundred 
countries in 1990–2004; he conlcudes that while most countries made 
money on their reserves in 1990–2001, most lost money in 2002–04. 
One should keep in mind, however, the difficulties in tracing the full 
benefits of hoarding reserves: 
“While assessing the fiscal cost of holding reserves, it would be 
worthwhile to set off the benefits that the country may have 
in holding reserves. In any country risk analysis by the rating 
agencies and other institutions, the level of reserves generally has 
high weights. Moreover, it is essential to keep in view some hidden 
benefits which could accrue to a country holding reserves, which 
may, inter alia, include: maintaining confidence in monetary and 
exchange rate policies; enhancing the capacity to intervene in foreign 
exchange markets; limiting external vulnerability so as to absorb 
22. See Aizenman and Marion (2004) for empirical results on the adverse effects 
of political instability on hoarding international reserves. 
23. See Levy Yeyati (2008), who advocates a combined scheme of, first, decentralized 
reserves in the form of liquid asset requirements on individual banks to limit moral 
hazard and, second, an ex-ante suspension-of-convertibility clause to reduce the self-
insurance costs while limiting bank losses in the event of a run. 
24. See Calvo (1991) for an early discussion on the quasi-costs of sterilization. 468 Joshua Aizenman
shocks during times of crisis; providing confidence to the markets 
that external obligations can always be met; and reducing volatility 
in foreign exchange markets. It is true that beyond a point, when 
the credit rating reaches appropriate investment grade, addition to 
reserves may not lead to further improvement in the credit rating. 
It is necessary to recognize that, as in the case of costs, there are 
difficulties in computing the benefits too.” (Reddy, 2006.)
Third, any government in the process of analyzing its international 
reserve management program faces coordination issues. While this 
paper has focused on international reserve management as self-
insurance, international reserve management may be part of a 
fiscal scheme to augment social security and future pensions. This 
is especially relevant for commodity-exporting countries like Chile, 
Norway, and so on. The management of these funds is best delegated 
to two different agencies. One, like the central bank, should undertake 
international reserve management as part of a prudent macroeconomoic 
management throughout the business cycle. The second fund is best 
managed by the treasury or the social security administration, as it 
deals with long-term intergenerational transfer.25 
To conclude, this paper outlined several motives for hoarding 
international reserves in this era of growing financial integration. 
The message of the report is mixed, and reserve management is not 
a panacea. The mercantilist case for hoarding international reserves, 
as an ingredient of an export-led growth strategy, is dubious. Done 
properly, however, international reserve management reduces 
downside risk in turbulent times. These benefits are especially 
important for commodity-exporting countries and countries with 
limited financial development. 
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APPENDIX A
Data Definitions and Sources
This appendix defines the key variables used in the main paper 
and outlines the data sources. For the indebtedness ranking, country 
classification by income level, data availability, and estimated C for 
each country, see Aizenman (2006, tables B1–B4).26
—Manufactures: the average of annual observations of the 
percentage of economic activity dedicated to the production of 
manufactures (measured as percentage of GDP). Following the 
definition given by the United Nations, manufactures include the 
tabulation category D and divisions 15–37 in the International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, 
Revision 3. Manufactures are defined as the physical or chemical 
transformation of materials or components into new products, 
whether the work is performed by power-driven machines or by 
hand, whether it is done in a factory or in the worker’s home, and 
whether the products are sold wholesale or retail. The definition 
includes assembly of component parts of manufactured products and 
the recycling of waste materials.
—Commodities: the average of annual observations of the 
percentage of economic activity dedicated to the production of 
agricultural products, mining, hunting, and utilities.
—Reserves: the average of annual observations of the stock of 
reserves over GDP taken during the sample period. The sample period 
depends on data availability.
—Nominal exchange rate volatility: the average annual volatility 
of the nominal exchange rate. Each annual observation corresponds 
to the percent standard deviation of the monthly nominal rate of the 













—Financial integration: the average of annual observations of 
Edward’s (2001) measure of financial integration.
—Inflation: the average of annual CPI inflation observations.
—Terms of trade: the average of annual observations of the terms of 
trade defined as the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding 
import price index, measured relative to the base year (2000).
26. Available online at www.nber.org/papers/w12734.470 Joshua Aizenman
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